


REBUILDING KUWAIT

Janet A. McDonnell

Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the planning and preparation for the reconstruction of Kuwait was conducted with representatives from the governments of Kuwait and the United States. The author looks at the organizations that were formed in order to plan for and execute the reconstruction effort that would begin once Kuwait was liberated. The author also presents an account of the efforts made by units during the restoration and rebuilding of Kuwait. Finally, she recommends that post hostility plans must provide for adequate logistical support for units entering the area without.



IN THE wake of the four-day ground war against Iraq, the US Army mounted the largest military civil reconstruction operation since World War II in an effort to restore the shattered country of Kuwait. The Army played a critical role in the reconstruction of Kuwait, smoothing the fragile transition from hostilities to peace. Kuwait had never faced a disaster of this magnitude and was unable to provide for its own recovery needs. Bringing its resources to bear, the Army conducted damage assessments, restored electrical power and water supplies, cleared the roads of debris and provided emergency medical care and other essential services.

Planning and preparation for the reconstruction of Kuwait began soon after the Iraqi invasion on 2 August 1990. Anticipating extensive damage from the Iraqi occupation and ensuing combat operations, the exiled Emir of Kuwait established a government committee called the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP) made up of American-educated, mid-level Kuwaiti officials to manage the recovery operations. On 9 October 1990, Kuwait's ambassador to the United States, Shaikh Saud Nasir Al-Sabah, sent a letter to President George Bush formally requesting US assistance in putting together an emergency recovery program.

The first organization formed in response to the Kuwaiti request was an interagency policy coordinating committee, which included representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This committee requested civil affairs (CA) support from the Department of the Army. Regular Army units did not have sufficient personnel, equipment and resources to accomplish all that the Kuwaitis wanted, so officials turned to Reserve Component units. On 22 November 1990, the chairman of the JCS requested that the chief of staff of the Army activate elements of the 352d CA Command, a US Army Reserve unit based in Riverdale, Maryland.

A cell of 57 reservists from the 352d formed the Kuwait Task Force (KTF) to coordinate with their Kuwaiti counterparts in planning for emer-

gency services and reconstruction. Specifically, they planned for restoration in the areas of public safety, health, utilities, transportation, communication, administration and welfare. During

By the time the air war against Iraq had begun, the Army was deeply involved in the recovery effort. . . . Before deploying, members of the KTF had helped KERP obtain over \$558 million in contracts for emergency supplies, food, water, equipment and future services. On 28 January, an advance party from the corps' KERO arrived in Saudi Arabia, where it executed contracting actions and logistic purchases necessary to accomplish the reconstruction mission.

December and early January, they focused on contracting for emergency supplies and services, not an easy task since the scope of damage remained unclear.¹

For the repair of physical infrastructure, Kuwaiti officials also turned to the Army Corps of Engineers because of its extensive experience responding to natural disasters. On 4 January 1991, the Kuwait government formally requested emergency assistance from the corps. Under a \$46.35 million Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case approved on 14 January, the corps would assist the government of Kuwait in restoring facilities and systems controlled by the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Electricity and Water and the National Guard. Soon after, the corps established a Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO), under then Colonel Ralph V. Locurcio, to conduct damage surveys and administer reconstruction contracts. The government of Kuwait later increased its allocation in the \$46.35 million FMS case through a letter of exchange between the two countries under Section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law [PL] 87-195, as amended).

By the time the air war against Iraq had begun, the Army was deeply involved in the

recovery effort. On 26 January, 48 of the 57 KTF members deployed to Saudi Arabia under the 352d's deputy commander, Colonel Randall Elliot. Before deploying, members of the KTF had helped KERP obtain over \$558 million in contracts for emergency supplies, food, water, equipment and future services. On 28 January, an advance party from the corps' KERO arrived in Saudi Arabia, where it executed contracting actions and logistic purchases necessary to accomplish the reconstruction mission.

In January, as KTF and KERO personnel moved into Saudi Arabia, the center of the Kuwait reconstruction planning activities shifted from Washington, D.C. to the theater of operations. It was clear that at the end of the hostilities, the people of Kuwait would urgently need emergency supplies and services. Theater

After evaluating the restoration mission, ARCENT officials concluded that they needed to provide a command and control element that could combine the assessment capabilities of the CA command and the logistic support of a US Army Area Support Group. . . . Task Force Freedom was made up of ARCENT (Fwd) headquarters and the appropriate CA, engineer, medical, military police and logistic support needed to manage the emergency and restoration.


commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf placed the commander of the Army Forces US Central Command (ARCENT), Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, in charge of restoring Kuwait's essential services and infrastructure, and Yeosock delegated this task to his subordinate commander, Brigadier General Robert S. Frix.²

To accomplish the Army's humanitarian assistance mission, ARCENT created a Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF), a group of 550 professionals (mostly reservists) with a broad range of skills in the public service areas, under the leadership of Brigadier General

Howard T. Mooney, commander of the 352d CA Command. The CCATF consisted of the 352d CA Command, 96th CA Battalion (a headquarters and three companies), 431st CA Company, 432d CA Company and the KTF. On 14 February, the CCATF units convened in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, where they were trained and organized.³

After evaluating the restoration mission, ARCENT officials concluded that they needed to provide a command and control element that could combine the assessment capabilities of the CA command and the logistic support of a US Army Area Support Group. In mid-February, Frix formed Task Force *Freedom*, which was made up of ARCENT (Fwd) headquarters and the appropriate CA, engineer, medical, military police and logistic support needed to manage the emergency and restoration operations in Kuwait. Task Force *Freedom* would function as an umbrella organization for all relief and reconstruction activities in Kuwait. This provisional organization, which grew to 3,400 troops at one point, included the CA Task Force, 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, 720th Military Police Brigade, 2d Aviation Brigade, 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group, 44th Signal Brigade, elements of the 416th Engineer Command and the 22d Support Command. As the senior Army commander in Kuwait, Frix was also responsible for overseeing and coordinating KERO activities.

As the four-day ground war drew to a close on 28 February, Task Force *Freedom* components moved north into Kuwait City. The CCATF convoy left Jubail at 1430, 28 February, arriving in Kuwait City at 0230, 29 February. Accompanying the 352d CA Command were 76 flatbed trucks loaded with emergency supplies of food, water and medicine, the product of Kuwait/KTF contracting. Troops moving north on 28 February encountered a "black fog" (smoke from the burning oil wells) so dense that they had to turn on their headlights in the middle of the day. The clothing and faces of the soldiers were quickly coated with an oily black film. Frix established his headquarters, Camp Freedom, in a warehouse complex near the Kuwait



Army personnel found Kuwait severely damaged but not destroyed.

The amount of structural damage was less than anticipated, but the entire country was without water, electricity, sanitation and other basic infrastructure. The most critical tasks for KERO were to assess the damage and mobilize the eight firms selected to do reconstruction work. . . . The first phase was devoted to emergency assistance and focused on . . . the following areas: electricity, water, food, medical supplies, sanitation, public service, public security and safety, transportation and the repair of public buildings.

International Airport. Similarly, a 40-person KERO advance party along with 40 Kuwaiti volunteer engineers arrived in Kuwait City on 4 March to begin recovery operations.⁴

Meanwhile in Washington, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney outlined the Department of Defense's (DOD's) assistance to Kuwait, dividing the response into two phases: emergency response and reconstruction. The emergency response phase would begin the day Kuwait was liberated and would be directed by the deputy commander of ARCENT and the Task Force *Freedom* commander.⁵ In other words, the initial emergency work would remain a US Central Command responsibility.

Army personnel found Kuwait severely damaged but not destroyed. The amount of structural damage was less than anticipated, but the entire country was without water, electricity,

sanitation and other basic infrastructure. The most critical tasks for KERO were to assess the damage and mobilize the eight firms selected to do reconstruction work. KERO damage assessment teams were operating within 72 hours after hostilities ceased and, by 20 November 1991, had completed over 1,200 damage assessments. As KERO teams conducted damage assessment surveys, the CA units established centers to distribute needed food, water and medical care.

The first phase was devoted to emergency assistance and focused on restoring essential supplies and services such as food, water and electricity. The major emergency response efforts of the CA units and KERO focused specifically on the following areas: electricity, water, food, medical supplies, sanitation, public service, public security and safety, transportation and the repair of public buildings.

Electricity was the key utility. Without it, water, sanitation, public safety and medical support were critically impaired. All other utilities

Communications had been virtually eliminated. The KTF arranged for the delivery of two truckloads of communications equipment to meet emergency requirements. The CCATF planned emergency communication support, and its negotiations with AT&T resulted in emergency telephone access to Kuwait. CA units also helped reestablish the postal system.

and critical infrastructure depended on electricity to function. Moreover, for Kuwait residents who had survived the trauma and uncertainty of the Iraqi occupation, dependable electrical service was a symbol of the stability of their government. Before the invasion, Kuwait's electricity had been provided through four major power stations, a series of substations and sophisticated overhead distribution systems. Three of the four power stations were damaged during the Iraqi occupation, and over 6,000 kilometers (km) of power lines were down or damaged.

To provide immediate relief, Army prime power units repaired damaged generators and installed new ones. Prime power units, assigned to the chief of engineers, install, maintain and operate power generation equipment to support military contingency plans worldwide and provide technical advice when needed. In Kuwait, prime power elements of the 535th Engineer Detachment, attached to the 416th Engineer Command, conducted damage assessments and helped restore power at hospitals, food distribution warehouses, police stations, telecommunications centers, banks and other locations identified by the 352d CA Command.⁶

The corps' KERO element, augmented by contract electrical crews, immediately began making emergency repairs to the least damaged power plant and temporary repairs to overhead

transmission lines. Through these efforts, primary power was restored to Kuwait City on 23 March, only a month after the Iraqis had cut it off. KERO and its contractors repaired all 300-kilovolt overhead lines and worked on over 5,000 km of cable. By the end of 1991, they had repaired roughly 10,000 km of transmission line and 29 key electrical substations.

Another major resource, potable water, was critical for maintaining public health. All major water pumping stations were inoperable, and the 2-billion-gallon water reservoir system was nearly empty. Because of depleted reserves, low pressure and broken pipes, only a few parts of the city had water service. Kuwaiti desalinization plants could not resupply the city because they lacked electricity for plant operation and because pumps and distribution lines were damaged or destroyed.

The KTF had planned for this by purchasing bottled water and pre-positioning it for delivery into Kuwait. Soon after liberation, over 500 bulk water tanker trucks were delivering 1.8 million liters of water a day. The CCATF regularly tested available supplies in the fresh water reservoirs to determine if they were safe for consumption, while KERO supervised the repair of major breaks in the pipelines. Dependable water supplies were restored in July 1991, and the Ministry of Electricity and Water subsequently assumed responsibility for producing, storing and distributing water.

Although sewage treatment plants had not sustained structural damage, they too were inoperable. Disuse during the occupation led to major blockages and mechanical failures in the sanitation system, and numerous breaks in the collection and distribution lines hampered operations. KERO prepared the initial damage survey reports, and its contractors repaired sewage mains. A separate Kuwaiti-managed contractor was responsible for restoring the treatment plants and pumping stations to operation after the electrical supply was restored.

In the area of food and medical supplies, the KTF arranged for convoys, with hundreds of trucks carrying 1,250 metric tons of food sup-



Civilians receiving bottled water and MREs at a food distribution point.

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plies. Six hospitals were rapidly stocked with medical supplies. The CCATF helped ensure that thousands of tons of emergency food, water and medical supplies were shipped into Kuwait and distributed effectively. In the first three weeks of March, 60,000 tons of supplies were brought into Kuwait.

The areas of public service and public security posed their own problems. Communications had been virtually eliminated. The KTF arranged for the delivery of two truckloads of communications equipment to meet emergency requirements. The CCATF planned emergency communication support, and its negotiations with AT&T resulted in emergency telephone access to Kuwait. CA units also helped reestablish the postal system.

Since most Kuwaiti government vehicles had been stolen or vandalized, the KTF helped the Kuwaitis purchase 746 vehicles for police, sani-

tation, fire protection and public transportation. CA units coordinated 35 supply convoys and 48 airlift missions for delivery of fire-fighting and other essential equipment. A CCATF team helped bring Kuwait's nonexistent police force to a force of 6,000 police officials. By the end of April, 10 fire stations and 16 police stations were operational.

There were also serious problems in the area of transportation. All major roads into Kuwait were significantly damaged during the occupation. Nuwaisib Road, a six-lane expressway connecting Kuwait City with the Saudi Arabian border, sustained 11 km of complete destruction in the northbound lane, while the southbound lane suffered 20 km of trenching designed to impede traffic.

KERO's immediate goal was to clear and make emergency repairs to the major highways in the south to expedite the flow of supplies from

Saudi Arabia. Also, the government of Kuwait was anxious to open its southern borders to allow citizens to return. Along the Valley of

The schools in Kuwait had been closed for nearly a year, since the Iraqi invasion, and the reopening of the schools was an important indicator of a return to normalcy. . . . [They had been] used as troop medical clinics, command and control headquarters, supply points and billets. . . . Gymnasiums [were used] for vehicle maintenance. The schools had been badly damaged by extensive Iraqi looting, arson and vandalism. Between May and August 1991, KERO repaired 145 schools in time for opening day.

Death, the road from Kuwait City to Basra that served as the Iraqi escape route, KERO repaired 170 craters and removed hundreds of bunkers.

Roads within Kuwait City were littered with destroyed military vehicles, abandoned cars, mines and bomb craters. Iraqi occupation troops had also erected numerous barriers, fortification bunkers and guard houses at intersections and overpasses in Kuwait City that had to be removed. Paving was a challenge since asphalt had to be transported from 200 miles away in Saudi Arabia. Ultimately KERO and its contractors removed 3,700 barriers, bunkers, and vehicles and repaired 200 km of road. In addition, KERO helped reopen the ports by providing technical assistance and conducting surveys.⁷

Access to air traffic was a crucial element in the recovery. Second to the ports, the airport was the major center of commerce and the primary gateway for passenger traffic. Hostilities and Iraqi sabotage had shut down the two major runways. The two main terminals had sustained fire and artillery damage. After initial damage assessments, KERO contractors set to work removing obstacles blocking the runways and repairing terminals, hangars, runways and other facilities. The airport opened to commercial

traffic 45 days after liberation and resumed full operation in July 1991.

The repair of certain government and public buildings was also a major mission during the emergency response phase. Damaged government structures included the National Assembly building, Bayan Conference Center and the headquarters of most ministries. Almost all were defaced by looting and vandalism, while others sustained major fire damage. Public buildings included hospitals, fire and security, communication, transportation and school facilities. The restoration of these government and public buildings was the largest effort of KERO and its contractors.

On 30 April, the recovery effort moved from the emergency response phase to the reconstruction phase when Cheney transferred authority from the theater commander to secretary of the Army. Effective 30 April, Cheney designated the secretary of the Army as his executive agent for Kuwait reconstruction. The secretary, in turn, assigned oversight responsibility to the assistant secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics and Environment (ASA/ILE) in coordination with the Army General Counsel for all actions associated with Kuwait reconstruction.⁸

Responsibility for the recovery shifted from Task Force *Freedom* to the newly created Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO), under Major General Patrick J. Kelly. Cheney had previously designated Kelly as the secretary of defense representative for reconstruction assistance in anticipation of the transition. Kelly's task would be to assist the secretary of the Army in planning and coordinating DOD reconstruction assistance to Kuwait. On 30 April, the CCATF concluded its mission and redeployed in early May 1991, except for 19 members of the KTF who joined the DRAO organization. KERO continued its contracting activities with direction from DRAO.⁹

The reconstruction phase included more permanent repairs to the electrical and water supply systems and the expansion of repairs to government and public buildings and transportation networks.



The Al Jahra road
between Kuwait
City and Basra,
March 1991.

Roads within Kuwait City were littered with destroyed military vehicles, abandoned cars, mines and bomb craters. Iraqi occupation troops had also erected numerous barriers, fortification bunkers and guard houses at intersections and overpasses in Kuwait City that had to be removed. Paving was a challenge since asphalt had to be transported from 200 miles away in Saudi Arabia. Ultimately KERO and its contractors removed 3,700 barriers, bunkers, and vehicles and repaired 200 km of road.

One of the greatest successes of this phase was the repair of the schools. The schools in Kuwait had been closed for nearly a year, since the Iraqi invasion, and the reopening of the schools was an important indicator of a return to normalcy. KERO conducted damage surveys of roughly 300 schools that the Iraqis had occupied and used as troop medical clinics, command and control headquarters, supply points and billets. They had even used school gymnasiums for vehicle maintenance. The schools had been badly damaged by extensive Iraqi looting, arson and vandalism. Between May and August 1991, KERO repaired 145 schools in time for opening day. The Ministry of Education was so impressed with the results that it assigned DRAO and KERO 14 more schools.

KERO and its contractors ultimately restored over 1,000 public buildings. By the end of the calendar year, the massive contract effort was

nearly complete, and DRAO phased out of operation. Virtually all of Kuwait's essential civil infrastructure had been rebuilt in just eight months.

The largest civil project outstanding was the reconstruction of Kuwait's National Assembly building, a facility equivalent to the US Capitol. The building had been the target of Iraqi destruction, and although its basic structure remained intact, the interior had been destroyed. KERO executed contracts for cleaning and reconstruction, so that work on the building would be completed in time for the national elections in October 1992. To expedite the work, the new KERO commander, Colonel David E. Peixotto, adopted the practice of partnering, bringing all parties involved together (Kuwaiti, KERO and contractor representatives) to establish common goals and solve problems in the project. A Kuwaiti contractor

finished the \$67 million restoration project on 29 July 1992.¹⁰

While work progressed on the National Assembly building, the Army reconstructed Kuwait defense facilities that had been heavily damaged by the Iraqis during the invasion and subsequent occupation and by the coalition air

On 17 February 1991 ... KERO [was told] that recovery contracts ... would have to be awarded by the first week of March 1991, four weeks ahead of schedule, because the ground war was expected to end sooner than anticipated. KERO thus had to award contracts on an accelerated basis to the contractors who could mobilize the quickest ... citing the unusual and compelling urgency provision in Title 10, US Code, 2304(c)(2), as the basis for limiting competition.

force. KERO managed an emergency repair program of approximately \$5.1 million that allocated roughly \$1.5 million to Ras Al-Qualaya Navy Base; \$1.5 million to Al-Salem Air Force Base; \$1.5 million to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense Headquarters building; and approximately \$6 million to the establishment of temporary hangar space at Kuwait International Airport for Kuwaiti air force planes. The work included such things as debris removal and temporary repairs to walls, roofs, windows, hangars and operations buildings.

Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense officials asked for US assistance in designing and reconstructing Al-Salem and Al-Jaber air bases, and a two-phase program was developed. A \$105 million FMS case was signed on 6 August 1991 for emergency design and restoration of the two bases to make them minimally operational. This phase included master planning to determine the scope and price of complete reconstruction work. A larger FMS case, which would provide for the permanent reconstruction of the air bases, has not yet been implemented.¹¹


Funding Authority

The DOD acted under two separate legal authorities in providing reconstruction assistance to Kuwait, and it set up procedures to ensure that its costs were reimbursed by the Kuwaitis. Restoration of Kuwaiti military facilities proceeded under the FMS provisions of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 90-629, as amended). Restoration of civil functions, however, proceeded under Section 607A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195, as amended), which permits an agency of the United States to furnish services and commodities to friendly countries on a reimbursable basis.

On 24 January 1991, the director of the US Trade and Development Program issued the Foreign Assistance Act Section 607(A) determination required for US government agencies to provide reimbursable services to Kuwait. On 19 February, the Department of State signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the government of Kuwait concerning the reconstruction of the infrastructure and the restoration of nonmilitary basic services in Kuwait. This MOU served as an "umbrella" agreement under which individual US government agencies could provide services or commodities to the government of Kuwait on a reimbursable basis through a simple exchange of letters with Kuwaiti government ministries and agencies.

Two days later, on 21 February, based on an assessment that the original \$46.35 million FMS case would be inadequate for the emergency period, Kuwaiti officials requested \$53.65 million in additional assistance from the corps under the Foreign Assistance Act and added the Ministry of Defense to the list of ministries receiving support. The Army General Counsel had determined that although the corps had initially used \$46.35 million from FMS funds to expedite the response, the Foreign Assistance Action Section 607A was a more appropriate source of funding because the work requested was civil reconstruction.

On 5 April, Kelly signed a letter of exchange with Dr. Ibrahim Al-Shaheen, director of



A destroyed aircraft hangar at Al Jaber Air Base.

The Army reconstructed Kuwait defense facilities that had been heavily damaged by the Iraqis during the invasion and subsequent occupation and by the coalition air force. . . . [KERO] allocated roughly \$1.5 million to Ras Al-Qualaya Navy Base; \$1.5 million to Al-Salem Air Force Base; \$1.5 million to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense Headquarters building; and roughly \$.6 million to the establishment of temporary hangar space at Kuwait International Airport for Kuwaiti air force planes.

KERO, which served as the vehicle for all civil restoration assistance provided by DOD, including damage surveys and assessments; design and construction services; procurement of equipment, supplies and materials; ordering procedures; finance arrangements and financial management; and contracting and procurement.¹²

Contracting Strategy

The US Army Corps of Engineers handled the contracting in Kuwait for DOD. Its initial strategy was to be as responsive as possible to the Kuwaitis and to accomplish the mission as quickly as possible, thus establishing credibility with the government of Kuwait in the emergency response phase. With the consent of Kuwaiti officials, DOD also gave preference to US firms seeking contracts.

On 17 February 1991, Ambassador Gnehm advised KERO that recovery contracts under the

initial \$46.35 million FMS case would have to be awarded by the first week of March 1991, four weeks ahead of schedule, because the ground war was expected to end sooner than anticipated. KERO thus had to award contracts on an accelerated basis to the contractors who could mobilize the quickest. KERO received authority to award up to eight letter contracts, citing the unusual and compelling urgency provision in Title 10, United States Code, 2304(c)(2), as the basis for limiting competition. Contractors were solicited from prequalified lists developed during Operation *Desert Shield*, as well as from other major contractors with demonstrated abilities with the corps. The corps awarded eight contracts totaling \$22.5 million to seven contractors for emergency repairs to sanitary, water and electrical systems; a harbor survey; road and highway repairs; and building repairs.

The basic contracting strategy changed little after the initial contract awards. KERO continued to assign additional work to the original contractors through unpriced contract modifications because of the urgency of the work.

As the urgency diminished, several projects were competed on a limited competitive basis. For example, repairs to the 707 and 747 hangars,

As normalcy returned and the government ministries resumed operations, Kuwaiti officials were ready to manage the contracting and minimize foreign involvement in their internal affairs. Recognizing this, ASA/ILE's Susan Livingstone issued guidance that DOD would not be involved in long-term civil contracts in Kuwait. Kelly agreed to limit KERO civil contracting to emergency reconstruction [operations].

the flight crew training center at Kuwait International Airport, repair of the Failaka Island Ferry Terminal and channel dredging were competed among prequalified contractors.

By 20 November 1991, the DOD had awarded \$246 million in contracts under the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 607A. By March 1992, the scope of the contracting effort under 607A had reached \$279 million.¹³ Ultimately, the combined total of FMS and 607A support reached \$450 million.

As normalcy returned and the government ministries resumed operations, Kuwaiti officials were ready to manage the contracting and minimize foreign involvement in their internal affairs. Recognizing this, ASA/ILE's Susan Livingstone issued guidance that DOD would not be involved in long-term civil contracts in Kuwait. Kelly agreed to limit KERO civil contracting to emergency reconstruction and directed that contract work be concluded by the summer of 1992.

One element of contracting strategy that became increasingly important was the use of small and small disadvantaged (US) businesses

(SSDB) in Kuwait. The SSDB-related provisions of the Federal Acquisition regulations (or those of the Arms Export Control Act) did not automatically apply to overseas service contracts. Yet, increasing political pressure forced ASA/ILE and DRAO to initiate a more vigorous SSDB "strategy" in May and June. These plans included inserting SSDB clauses in all KERO contracts (whether using FMS or 607A funds) that required contract proposals to have SSDB subcontracting plans and identifying specific "set asides" (small projects that could be handled by SSDBs) within all proposals and contracts. Later, existing contracts were modified to include such clauses whenever possible, and SSDB programs became an increasingly important factor in competitive contractor evaluation and selection.

Initially DRAO and KERO tried to increase small business participation by encouraging prime contractors to subcontract to small firms. They later made the small business plan a major factor in evaluating a contract proposal after cost. Still dissatisfied, on 26 July, Assistant Secretary Livingstone, in coordination with the corps, established a goal of awarding not less than 5 percent of the contract value and modifications for small business. With the concurrence of Kuwait, DRAO/KERO initiated a Small Disadvantaged Business Outreach Program in which a number of projects in Kuwait were reserved for competition between small disadvantaged businesses. By late October 1992, 8.8 percent of the value of civil restoration contracts and 6.9 percent of the value of the Kuwaiti air base program contracts had gone to SSDBs.¹⁴

There is much to be learned from the Army's experience in Kuwait. Events in Kuwait illustrate the need to plan carefully for the period after hostilities end. When the short ground war ended abruptly, the United States had no comprehensive, cohesive plan, such as it does for natural disasters, which encompassed all the federal agencies involved and provided a mechanism for these organizations to communicate and coordinate with each other. Outside of the

State Department and DOD, there was no overall structure for planning, coordination and execution. Other federal agencies might have been used more effectively if they had been included in the early planning process.

During the long months of Operation *Desert Shield*, the Army understandably focused its attention on the conflict with Iraq rather than planning for the aftermath of that conflict. Task Force *Freedom* and DRAO were both provisional organizations quickly crafted to meet the specific circumstances and immediate needs in Kuwait.

The Army's recovery effort succeeded only through combining the diverse strengths of active duty troops, CA reservists and Army Corps of Engineers civilians. The Corps provided invaluable contracting, construction and project management expertise, while CA units, drawing on their rich experience from their civilian jobs, involved themselves in banking, currency, food distribution, health, water and sanitation. Individual reservists worked closely with the Kuwait ministries to help them reconstruct their management structure. Thus, post-hostilities plans must include roles for Army Corps of Engineers civilians and CA units.

Post-hostilities plans must also provide adequate logistic support for units entering a disaster area. With power, water and food supplies disrupted in Kuwait, Task Force *Freedom* and KERO had to be fully self-supporting.

During the long months of Operation Desert Shield, the Army understandably focused its attention on the conflict with Iraq rather than planning for the aftermath of that conflict. Task Force Freedom and DRAO were both provisional organizations quickly crafted to meet the specific circumstances and immediate needs in Kuwait.

The Kuwait experience also demonstrated the importance of knowing when to shift from a US-directed civil-military operation to one directed by the host nation. From the beginning, policy makers recognized the need to hand over responsibility for the recovery to the government of Kuwait as expeditiously as possible.

In addition to the specific lessons to be learned about such things as planning, organizational structure, contracting strategy and regulations and funding authorities, are the broader, more important, lessons to be learned about the contributions the Army can make in assisting other nations. What role is appropriate for the Army in a post-hostilities environment, and what can it do to be better prepared for that role? How should the Army measure its success when involved in nation assistance? How does it ensure that it not only wins the war but also wins the peace? **MR**

NOTES

All records cited below are located in the Research collections of the Office of History, US Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

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2. "Kuwait Reconstruction Task Force After Action Report," (draft), 4.
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6. BG Ralph V. Locurcio, "Nation Assistance in Kuwait," *Engineer* (April 1992):32; *DEH Digest* (July 1991):9.

1992):32; *DEH Digest* (July 1991):9.

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8. Cheney memorandum to the secretary of the Army and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 April 1991.

9. Cheney memorandum to secretary of the Army, 7 March 1991.

10. For more information on the National Assembly building reconstruction, see *Engineer Update* (April 1992).

11. *DRAO Completion Report*, 27.

12. See Office of History File, Kuwait Reconstruction: Letter of Exchange.

13. *DRAO Completion Report*, 10-11; COL David Peixotto, Information Paper, 2 March 1992.

14. "Kuwait Reconstruction Task Force After Action Report" (draft); "KERO Status of Civil Restoration Contracts"; "KPO Status of MOD Program Contracts."

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